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Introduction
In early autumn, after harvest, the plotholders of Morotse1 village
thresh the maize from their fields. Gathering early every morning to
await the arrival of the tractor and threshing machine from the co-op,
they then work till sunset, the women pouring the ripe cobs into the
machine, and the few men weighing the sacks of threshed grain and loading
them onto the truck. The co-op officials, after taking a roll-call at
the end of the day, drive the tractor back to the co-op. Here the sacks
of maize are stored, awaiting their eventual delivery to the plotholders,
whose debts to the co-op must first be calculated, and then subtracted
from the total yield of each one.
On the morning of June 20th, 1983, after threshing had already been in
progress for about two weeks, the tractor arrived as usual. But on this
day, the driver found the group of plotholders waiting for him at the
gate: they blocked his way, and told him to take the machine back to the
co-op, for they intended to do no more work until those whose fields were
already completed had had their sacks of mealies delivered to them. After
driving to the village to consult a respected member of the community
who advised him, regretfully, to comply with the farmers' wishes if he
wished to avoid serious trouble, he returned to the co-op.
The day before, in response to mounting complaints from plotholders about
not having yet received their mealies, the co-op officials had invited
these people to the office to collect their accounts, after which, they
promised, the sacks would be delivered. But this attempt at negotiation
increased the farmers1 anger rather than defusing it. Incensed by the
hopeless extent of the debt of which each one's account showed proof,
and by the apparent impossibility of ever repaying this debt, they moved
towards the office, shouting threats and demanding their sacks of maize.
The names of all places and people in this paper have been changed.
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Members of the Lebowa police force were standing by to disperse the crowd.
The farmers' unwi11ingness to compromise, however, was clear from the
incident of the following day in which the tractor was turned back from
the fields.
Only on Monday the 22nd, two days after the tractor incident, were the
plotholders finally persuaded to accept a kind of compromise. The chief
arrived, with several co-op officials. He chastised the farmers, in-
voking their loyalty to him, and to the village headman against whom much
of their anger had been directed during the incident. He also, however,
apologised for not having been present to ensure that people received
their mealies immediately after threshing, and promised them that he
would arrange this in future. They, in turn, agreed to return to the
fields. The following day, threshing proceeded as normal. The burning
question of debt remained unanswered. It, and many other questions and
complaints about the co-op, once again became topics to be discussed and
grumbled about only between friends and relatives, and possibly to
re-emerge in future near-violent incidents.
To understand these people's strong feelings about the way in which their
agricultural activities are presently organised, and their powerlessness
to act on these feelings in any other way than through sporadic outbursts
like the one described above, it is necessary to know something about
their history and something, specifically, of the background to their
experience of farming.
Their village, Morotse, is situated on the peripheries of Lebowa, on one
of a group of "Trust farms" which were bought from white owners after
1936 to add to the existing Bantustan area. Like other such settlements,
Morotse is populated mainly by ex-labour tenants. These people - both
Pedi- and Ndebele-speaking - have since the late 1930s been moving to
Lebowa from the nearby white farms where they once lived and worked.
Those who moved at the beginning of this period arrived on the "Trust"
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early enough to establish their rights to land for ploughing, while those
who came since the late 1960s were able only to acquire residential
stands. It is to the former group, comprising about 30% of the popu-
lation, that the farmers of the tractor-stopping incident belong. The
present paper is concerned primarily with this landholding minority, but
it will also examine, as a subsidiary theme, some of the relationships
that exist between these farmers and the majority - continually growing
- of landless people.
For those who do have farming land, there have been many changes in the
practice of agriculture since they first came to the area. The most
recent and most substantial of these was the formation in 1979 of the
co-op, its introduction having, in part, been prompted by the recent
implementation of "betterment planning", with its recurrent partitioning
and reallocation of land.
Of Morotse's present inhabitants, the very earliest were, themselves,
labour tenants for the whites who owned the group of farms until these
were bought by the Trust. They were soon joined by people who had been
working on white farms further south and who, seeking a living situation
with fewer constraints, found that the owners of this new place would
allow them to live here in return, not for arduous labour contracts, but
for rent paid in cash. Both these groups of people were allotted sizeable
portions of land on which to do their own ploughing: one family claims
to have used 16 morgen on different parts of the farm, while another
informant, making a sweeping^ gesture, said "Before, the place was open.
We could plough wherever we liked". The amount of land to which each
household had access was certainly big enough to sustain the production
of a subsistence - maize, sorghum, beans and other vegetables - plus a
surplus of wheat, which was sold at white markets in nearby towns like
Stofberg and Middleburg. This living, during the period when whites still
occupied these farms, was combined for some with periods of unpaid labour
for the farm-owner, and for others with migrant labour. More young men
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started leaving to work for cash after the whites sold up and left the
area in the early 1940s, but this was "target" migrancy, aimed at earning
money for taxes or for the ceremonial gifts associated with weddings,
and to be abandoned after marriage. During this time, then, there was
sufficient land to allow for a peasant production which produced a sur-
plus, and which needed supplementing in cash only for sporadic, specific
purposes, and then only by one or two members of a large household.
There were changes in this style of agriculture with the arrival in the
mid-1950s of the Government planners known locally as the "Trust". First
they surveyed the land and decided which was suitable for ploughing,
grazing and residence respectively. The next stage, which gave Morotse
its present appearance but which will here be mentioned only in passing,
was the removal of people from their original clusters of residences and
their relocation in a concentrated settlement, where houses had to be
built in "lines". Then, most importantly for this paper, the ploughing
land was divided into plots of four morgen each, to be reallocated to
the people already living in the area, and to be newly allocated to the
ex-labour tenants who were continuing to arrive at a rate that increased
steadily over the next ten years. At the end of this period, in the mid-
to late 1960s, there was a replanning of the area to provide land for
the latest arrivals, leaving each villager with a ploughing plot of three
morgen in size. For those who arrived after the beginning of the 1970s,
there was no more ploughing land to be had.
As has been noted by Yawitch (1981), "betterment planning" as a Government
policy arose out of the Tomlinson Commission's proposal to create a class
of viable farmers in the African reserves. It never achieved this aim,
however, for in the areas where it was not abandoned due to fierce popular
resistance, it became a compromise between attempting to facilitate a
rational, planned agriculture and - more urgently - having to house the
Bantustan population whose continual increase was being ensured by var-
ious types of population resettlement. The case of the Trust farms in
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question demonstrates this process very neatly. The official planning
report for the area specifies that the economic unit for one household
using a mixed farming economy should be eight morgen of dryland for
ploughing, and eleven large stock units requiring 49,5 morgen of grazing
land.2 It is the same report which details the division of the ploughing
land into plots of only half this recommended size, and the further
curtailment of these plots by one morgen each followed a few years
later.3 These planning decisions were clearly made in view of the popu-
lation increase rather than to promote better farming.
The effects on farming of this subdivision of land were, predictably,
that yields dropped and fewer kinds of crops could be grown. One
informant claimed that it was straight after the "Trust" arrived to cut
her fields that her husband first went to work in town, and although it
would be facile to claim that planning heralded the collapse of
subsistence farming for all households in the area, it certainly seems,
for most, to have changed the role of farming from a primary to a sup-
plementary one.
It was in response to this crisis in food production that a headman in
the area - also its MP in the Lebowa parliament - and the local extension
officer started in 1974 a ploughing project, the predecessor to the co-op
mentioned in this paper's introduction. With very limited resources at
first, but aided by funds from the Lebowa Government, the project's 56
initial members clubbed together to buy fertiliser and to buy or hire
other equipment. The worth of this enterprise, according to its agri-
cultural officer co-founder Mr. Sithole, was proved by the yield of the
first harvest: an average of nine and a half bags of maize per morgen,
2
 A household subsisting from dryland farming alone, claims a local
agricultural officer, would need 25-30 morgen of land.
3
 Grazing resources at this stage were still adequate, being well
within the planning report's specifications, but by 1982 a new report
indicated that there were only about three morgen of grazing land
per large stock unit.
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as against the planning report's estimated average yield for the area
of three and a half bags. The project, claims Mr. Sithole, was so suc-
cessful at rehabilitating people's exhausted and overworked plots that
by 1978 there was a flood of applications from other plotholders wishing
to become members. Since Government funds were low, the project's MP
co-founder applied to the Lebowa Development Corporation for finance to
enable the scheme's expansion. The money was lent, and the Ndebele
Co-operative, formed in 1979 to replace the project, took over its running
in 1980.
There is no doubt that this co-op has caused a dramatic improvement in
the productivity of Morotse farmers' fields. In 1981, for instance, there
was an average yield per morgen of 35 bags, and despite drought in the
two following years, the harvests remained well in excess of those
produced in neighbouring areas. The attitude of most plotholders towards
the organisation, however, is one of suspicion and antagonism, sometimes
erupting into outright aggression, as happened in the incident described
earlier. Co-op officials regard this as proof of a primitive
backwardness. They see it as a stubborn refusal on the part of these
people to appreciate the efforts being made in their own interests, and
attribute it to "their culture" and "their beliefs": an assessment of
the situation which shares much with the view of writers in the tradition
of Redfield and Foster who see peasants as having a conservativeness and
obstructiveness to change that is inherent in their culture (Hutton and
Cohen 1975). A detailed look at the many changes wrought by the co-op's
introduction - changes more far-reaching and fundamental than the obvious
one of an increase in the yield of maize from the land - reveals that
the reasons for the apparent conservatism of Morotse's landholders are
complex, and cannot be sought on the level of economic rationality alone,
even though, economic considerations do, themselves, play an important
part in shaping this antagonism towards the co-op.
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Among these changes, the most apparent are those concerned with agri-
culture itself, and the social relationships it involves.
Ploughing
Previously, some plotholders had ploughed using their own oxen or trac-
tors. Others, having no implements or draught animals of their own, had
relied on fellow-villagers to do the work for them. Immediately prior
to the introduction of the co-op, this was a service done in return for
cash, but in an earlier period of Morotse*s history it had been a form
of assistance performed without reward, at least in material terms. A
similar practice had been current in the Pedi heartland (Monnig 1967:160)
and, as in Morotse, this type of co-operation was transformed into a cash
service. It became common for families with absent migrants to hire the
services of a ploughman with his team of oxen and plough: equipment which
was usually purchased with the proceeds of raigrancy, and which enabled
its owner to retire to the countryside and earn an adequate living there
(Sansom 1974:169).
Setting aside for the moment the phenomenon of these rural entrepreneurs,
and looking at why it is that some households could do their own ploughing
while others could not, one must appreciate two factors. One is the
presence, or absence due to migrancy, of able-bodied men, and the other
is whether or not the household owned agricultural equipment. The latter
of these factors, in Morotse, is linked to the conditions under which
its villagers used to live as labour tenants, and to their different
reasons for leaving the white farms. It is a case which differs sig-
nificantly, therefore, from that of the heartland communities described
by Monnig and Sansom.
Some of the village's present inhabitants arrived early, having decided
independently of external constraints to leave their labour tenancies
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in order to seek for a more autonomous living situation. They left their
farms at a time before the restrictions on labour tenants were partic-
ularly arduous, and this meant, among other things, that few if any
limitations had been placed on the number of stock they were allowed to
keep. When they moved to Morotse, then, many brought considerable numbers
of cattle with them, and this was facilitated by the fact that most had
already been living fairly close by. The chiefly Ralebetse family had
50 cattle when they came to the area in 1939 from Buffelsvallei about
15 kilometers away; and the five sons of the household used these to
plough their father's, and later their own, fields. The Masilos, who
had arrived from the same area some years beforehand, had ten cattle to
start with, and these bred until the family owned 30. Although Swartbooi
Masilo at first migrated seasonally to work on the roads, his family later
earned enough money through the sale of their produce to buy their own
plough, and he became a permanent country-dweller.
In contrast, the people who arrived later had, in most cases, remained
as labour tenants until their eviction by the farm owner. Often, this
eviction was due to their children's refusal to fulfil the labour re-
quirements of the tenancy. By the time they left the farms, limitations
on stock had become stringent. Many informants from this category had
been allowed to own no cattle at all, and even for those who did possess
a few animals, the farms from which they trekked were often so far-flung
(in districts such as Lydenburg, Belfast, and Carolina) that instead of
bringing these cattle with them, they sold them before leaving. For these
people, mostly Ndebele-speakers, there were still dryland plots to be
had if they arrived before 1970, but they had no draught animals with
which to plough.
Voli Mtshweni belongs to one such family. With her husband, children,
and stepchildren, she came to the area in 1960, having been evicted from
the farm Renosterhoek because the children refused to work there. Having
brought no stock, they worked their new fields for the first year with
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a plough and span of oxen hired from Mazimgele Kabini, who had b^en living
in the area for many years. In subsequent years they paid Kleinbooi
Skhosana to do their ploughing with his tractor. By the time the co-op
was introduced, many of the plotholders who had no oxen or implements
of their own were hiring Skhosana.
Skhosana is a unique figure in the area. Unlike the other latecomers
described above, who were evicted from their farms and arrived with next
to nothing, he brought several tractors and an array of ploughing and
weeding machinery with him when he came in 1967. For years he had been
running the farm Mooifontein for its white owner on a crop-sharing basis,
and from the proceeds of this enterprise he had gradually built up a stock
of his own farming equipment. He had a reputation for being the best
ploughman in the village, but a number of other people (at least one
through his encouragement) were also working other plotholders' fields
in return for payments in cash, having bought themselves tractors and
ploughs with the proceeds of migrancy.
It seems that these tractor-owners soon, took over as professional
ploughmen from their humbler counterparts who worked with teams of oxen.
This left the latter to use their equipment only for the ploughing of
their own fields. Local links between a stock owner and a few neighbours
needing someone to plough .for them were transformed into cross-village
links between the mass of plotholders, and the very few owners of trac-
tors. The latter approximate most closely the rural entrepreneurs de-
scribed by Sansom (op cit).
When the co-op took over ploughing, the effects varied for these different
sets of people. For the tractor-owners, it meant the effective end of
their country-based cash earnings: this was true for all except Skhosana,
whom the co-op contracted to plough certain blocks of fields for them.
For those owning oxen and their own ploughs, and still trying to maintain
a close approximation to the subsistence farming of earlier years, it
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meant a drastic reduction in the usefulness of their herds of stock,
carefully tended and built up over the years. For the poorer plotholders,
on the other hand, it signified a kind of levelling of opportunity, even
if only in the sense that it reduced to the same level as themselves the
farmers who had previously enjoyed the advantage of owning their own
equipment.
Recruitment of Labour
Now, this year, they say we owe money; but why did they not tell
us before? Why do they only tell us now? We also have to pay the
children that we hire, because you can't work alone, you won't
finish in time.
This statement by a Morotse woman neatly summarises some present reali-
ties about the relationships involved in agriculture in the area,. Re-
lationships of reciprocity between village people which were actualised,
at times of intensive work, in tnatsema or work parties have largely been
replaced by contractual relationships. It may not be only the co-op that
has effected this change, but the mention of time constraints in the
quotation above indicates that the new organisation has had an important
role in this regard. Before examining this aspect in detail, it is
necessary first to look at how work parties once functioned in this
village, and to draw on some comparative material in examining their role.
As Kukertz (1984) notes, much of the ethnographic literature on tradi-
tional South African societies gives a picture of work parties as occa-
sions of "mutual helpfulness", serving to unite separate households or
kin-clusters into a broader community of common purpose. Inherent in
this general view is that the work party system ensured an equality of
access to labour amongst a community's members, with the exception,
perhaps, of the chief. Sansom (1974:154-7) elaborates on the inherent
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egalitarianism of grain production using work parties." He postulates
that a man wanting to grow more grain than his fellows would be prevented
from doing so by being unable to recruit them as labourers for extra
periods of ploughing or planting. Even if, as an incentive, he provided
more beer and meat than others were able to, this would be inadequate
to tempt people from their own fields at the peak work period. When this
period ended, freeing landholders for possible extra work, a chiefly
prohibition on the tilling of any more, fresh land operated to further
prevent the emergence of differentiation based on grain-growing.
This view is disputed by David Webster (personal communication) who ar-
gues on the basis of his observations of subsistence producers among the
Thembe Tonga of Northern Natal. Here, a social differentiation between
grain cultivators does occur, and becomes progressively greater season
after season. Those whose food stocks are exhausted before the onset
of ploughing will - purely in search of nourishment - attend work parties
called by those who have a large remaining store of grain and meat. As
a result, the former have to delay their ploughing until other work
parties are over, by which time they may have missed the early rains.
In addition, lacking grain to make beer, and therefore in no position
to call work parties, they must plough their fields with household labour
alone. In this way, poorer cultivators may become locked into a cycle
of decreasing yields, while richer ones can consolidate their wealth year
after year. That there was a similar situation in Morotse prior to, or
during, the introduction of hired labour, was suggested by the agricul-
tural extension officer:
In the past they used to think, 'Have we got enough meat, have we
got enough beer, to pay those who will come to work?1 Usually
people used to find out whether this man has reserved a lot of
liquor, and if not they'll say, f0h, there is nothing there'. Only
those few who were interested would come and help.
* He contrasts this egalitarianism with the possibilities provided by
cattle-keeping for storing wealth and lending capital with interest.
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This evidence suggests that the work party system - even in heartland
communities - contained possibilities for reinforcing social differen-
tiation. In a Trust farm community such as that of Morotse, there were
other factors, as well, which made for an unevenness in the practice of
labour recruitment.
Firstly, a number of the Pedi-speakers who arrived in this area early
on were strong adherents of Christianity. This was a commitment that
manifested itself not only in belief and ritual, but in every aspect of
a person's social relationships as well. It meant, in the sphere of
agricultural work, a disdain for the use of the work party, which was
the means currently being employed to procure labour by other,
traditionalist, families who had arrived in the area. In the case of
Jacobs Ralebetse, this disapproval was especially strong since he was
the only man in his family to have espoused the Christian faith. At
ploughing time, when his father, uncles, brothers and cousins and their
families got together with neighbours to drink beer and then work on each
others' fields, Jacobs would inspan his own team of oxen and set off for
the fields accompanied only by his wife and children, who still recall
with a half-amused incredulity how hard and strictly he used to work them
there. He resembles the community's other converts to Christianity in
that it is through a disapproval of intoxicating drink that he expresses
his repugnance for work parties and other traditionalist institutions
like the headman's court. It is possible that men like Jacobs were
striving for the kind of economic individualism and independence from
the claims of extended family mentioned by writers on religious change
in Zambia (Long 1968). Given, however, the lack of documentary evidence,
and the vagueness of people's memories about exact yields, it cannot here
be clearly established whether the differences between the traditionalist
and Christian styles in agricultural labour laid the basis for some kind
of economic differentiation.
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Secondly, it has already been mentioned that the establishment of re-
lationships - co-operative or contractual - between people for the pur-
poses of ploughing was influenced by their different times of arrival
in the area. This factor must be considered, too, when looking at work
parties in Morotse. A statement from Sara Kabeni, who came in 1960,
indicates that although her family had relied on the labour of work
parties when cultivating their fields on the white farm where they lived
before, they could no longer do so after coming to Morotse and getting
a plot in the area. According to a woman in a similar position, "If you
made a party, you would get many to drink, but only two to work. People
only helped you if they liked you". The people who "liked" each other
were the early arrivals from the nearby farms, already bound together
by a common history on these farms. They were linked by kinship and
marriage ties, allegiance to the same holders of traditional authority,
and a tradition of reciprocal co-operation in agricultural work. Later
arrivals from far away, not integrated into this community, had to fail
back on immediate family, or hired labourers, to work on their new fields.
This pattern of paying helpers, or of being forced to rely on the labour
of close family alone, has since become the predominant one for "old"
and "new" families alike. Table 1 gives a breakdown of the percentage
of households sampled using these two different types of labour, and those
using a combination of both.
Table 1: Use of paid and unpaid labour
Type of labour
Family only
Paid only
Combination of
family & paid
Total
Households
30%
20%
50%
100%
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The co-op officials, who take a roll-call to check up on the number of
helpers accompanying each plotholder to the fields at peak periods, claim
that these helpers are all family members as "tradition" dictates, but
such a claim is misleading. Traditional labour requirements, as shown
above, were not satisfied by immediate family members alone, but neces-
sitated the concentrated input of the bigger group which could be called
together in a work party. To recruit a reasonable number of workers under
the present system, a plotholder needs either a cash income or a surplus
of maize with which to hire at least a few helpers. Ideally, the amount
of cash or produce expended in this way can be reduced by making use of
whatever family members are present - as in the "combination" category
- but it is unlikely that there will be enough of these members to cope
with all the work. This is because a relative, nowadays, will work
without remuneration on one's fields only if he or she "eats out of the
same pot".
A typical working group in the "family only" category, then, would consist
of only two to three people: most typically, a woman and two children;
or a woman, her co-resident daughter-in-law, and one child. All the
people interviewed in this "family only" category consider themselves
to be short of labourers, but are unable to pay for more as they have
neither a regular cash income nor the assurance of a grain yield large
enough to facilitate payment in kind.5 The lack of access to cash through
migrant remittances thus creates an intensification of intra-family de-
pendence in such households. This extreme dependence can be most clearly
seen in situations where, for some reason, the system so heavily relied
upon ceases to function. Such a case is that of Anna Kabini, one of whose
two daughters-in-law, despite the payment of bridewealth, lived with Anna
5
 Although there are many other variables accounting for differential
yields among plotholders, such as soil acidity, proximity to the
watercourse, etc., there does appear to be a correlation between the
size of a household's yield and the number of labourers working on
its fields. Households in the "family only" category thus tend to
reap smaller yields.
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far only a few months before returning to her own home. For the purposes
of harvesting and threshing, this means that Anna has only one helper,
her pension being too meagre to allow for the hiring of extra,
non-familial help.
The observation that cultivators in Morotse need cash inputs to achieve
even the humblest success in farming has a parallel in other studies of
Southern African peasant/proletarian populations. Cooper (1981) notes
a rural differentiation in Botswana based on the varied extent of in-
vestment made by people into farming using town-based cash earnings.
Writing of migrants in Lesotho, Murray (1981:87-99) attacks the widely
held belief that migrancy and subsistence farming provide alternative
means of making a living in that country, showing instead that "...farm
income is partly derived from the investments of migrants' earnings, and
households with an income from wage labour are better able to invest than
households without such an income"(p 87).
Before suggesting in what way the co-op could be seen as responsible for
this change in the system of labour recruitment, one or two details must
be noted about the kinds of people who become linked by these new con-
tractual arrangements, and about an interesting morality concerning the
type of currency in which it is considered appropriate to pay employees.
Of the plotholders surveyed who pay for all, or some of, the labour on
their fields, 22% employ non-co-resident members of their extended fam-
ilies. This practice is seen as a kind of favour to kinsmen, the reasons
given being something along the. lines of "I asked my daughter to come
and help me. She has no fields of her own, so she can grow nothing.
She needed the payment". The remaining 68% employ non-relatives; either
neighbours and close friends, in which case the contract is seen, again,
as a favour to the employee; or otherwise unknown people - sometimes
children - from other parts of the village, who in most cases approach
the plotholders and ask to be employed. Whether between kinsmen, friends,
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or total strangers, these contractual relationships, in almost all
cases,6 have in common the fact that they link together members of the
landholding minority.7
There is an interesting distinction drawn, however, between friends or
relatives on the one hand and strangers on the other. This is done not
only, as mentioned above, by the perception of the former relationship
as a personal one of magnanimity or paternalism, involving favours to
people close to one but less fortunate than oneself. The difference is
made clear, as well, in terms of the currency in which payment is made.
Kinsmen or neighbours who work on one's fields are most often paid in
kind, whereas strangers receive their wages in cash. Reckoned in purely
economic terms, there appears to be no difference between the two, as
the cash wage of R22 for eleven days' work is equivalent to the payment
in kind of one bag of mealies given for the same period. Using mealies
to pay a friend or family member thus functions to reassert the personal
component of a relationship that is otherwise becoming rapidly
depersonalised. It is an extension of the ideal of commensality, and
an attempt to counteract a tendency, observed in several cases, for
co-operating, family groups to become smaller and to exclude more and
more people.
The functioning of work parties in traditional Pedi - as in other -
communities was closely tied into the system of authority, in that
commoners could invite parties to begin ploughing and planting only once
the chief had performed rituals for the protection of the land and seeds
(Monnig 1967:159). The recruitment of labour for agriculture in
s
 In a very few cases, two relatives, both owning land, work for pay
on each other's fields. This depends on the co-op's decision about
when different fields are to be harvested, threshed, etc.
7
 The position of these landless people is similar to, but more extreme
than, that of the late-arriving plotholders mentioned earlier. Many
of them lack not only land but also social support-groups to be relied
on in times of emergencies.
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present-day Morotse, though vastly changed, is even more rigidly bound
up with the system of authority. Through the headman, one of whose major
functions is to act as mouthpiece for the co-op, this organisation's
officials issue instructions to plotholders about when harvesting or
threshing is to begin. Fanners must then arrive at the fields on the
designated day, accompanied by the requisite number of helpers, whose
presence is recorded during a roll-call. By the end of a specified pe-
riod, work on their camp of fields must be completed, so that the next
camp can be begun; and for one household to finish the harvest in a week
without extra help would be impossible. It is because of this urgent
hurry, say informants, that the old work parties are not held any more,
and people have to be paid to work instead. The co-op's efficiently and
rationally made plans are too large-scale and inflexible to be changed
in view of such eventualities as the absence of a crucial household member
- for work reasons, perhaps, or because of a funeral in another area -
at the time designated by the co-op for work to begin.
One might think that a peasant/proletarian community on the fringes of
the capitalist economy would, by 1983, be tied up with cash transactions
in every sphere of their lives. Why, then, should they focus animosity
on an agricultural co-op for causing the introduction of such trans-
actions into their farming? The reason for this is that, contrary to
all educative efforts by the puzzled co-op and Government officials,
Morotse plotholders see themselves as working, once again, under the kind
of restrictive authority which many of them left the white farms to es-
cape. Here, they complain, they are even worse off than they were as
labour tenants, as they get none of the few perks - food while working,
tea, packets of sugar - associated with that rather feudal relationship,
and they bear the added burden of being forced to pay helpers out of their
own pockets. In addition, their accounts show that most of them are
deeply in debt to the co-op for its capital-intensive inputs to their
lands of ploughing and fertiliser (and, in 1981, the use of a very ex-
pensive combine harvester). The co-op's offers to these people to lend
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them bags of maize in order to tide them over until a better year, is
of no comfort to them. As one woman put it, their reply to this offer
from the co-op was
You must give us the sacks, not lend them to us. How will we ever
pay back that debt? You will have to come and sell our houses and
furniture so that we can pay the debt; otherwise we will owe money
till we die.
This situation of hopeless debt combines with the responsibility of
paying for agricultural labour to make Morotse cultivators feel unfairly
dealt with. And it is the authority to which they are subject, an au-
thority whose basis is questioned by many of them, that provides the focus
for this feeling of outrage.
Structures of Control: the Loss of Autonomy
Diagrams pinned up on the walls in the offices of the co-op illustrate
the interlocking of the various bodies responsible for its running. Mr.
Sithole, the extension officer, summarised these rather complex-looking
diagrams as follows; "The Tribal Authority is there to give the land,
to help their people, the Lebowa Department of Agriculture is there to
see that everything is done properly, and the LLM (Lebowa Landbou
Maatskapy)8 is there to finance the co-op". The interaction between these
three is structured via various committees. Decisions are made by the
Directors' Committee: a body on which the chief of the area and his chief
councillor sit, along with some local notables chosen by them, such- as
successful shopkeepers and businessmen in the area. There are repre-
sentatives on this committee, too, from the LLM, the Lebowa Department
of Agriculture and Forestry, and the South African Government's Depart-
ment of Co-operation and Development. The Functioning Committee then
carries out these decisions: it comprises such people as the agricultural
8
 This is a division of the LDC (Lebowa Development Corporation), which
is controlled by the South African Government.
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extension officer and Mr de Jager, an employee of the LLM whose job is
to administer and manage the loan given by this company to the co-op.
His role is supposed to be embedded into a complex decision-making
process, with checks and counter-checks, in which "the tribe's" interests
are allegedly represented by the chief and his councillor. He has,
however, more power than is designated him in the official version of
the co-op's structure described above. It is a power that derives partly,
perhaps, from his being the only white amongst several blacks in a
Government-linked organisation. It stems even more, however, from the
fact that he represents the company which provides the money for this
enterprise.
It is the commanding presence of Mr de Jager at the co-op, and the in-
termittent presence of some other whites there, that partly accounts for
some plotholders' perception of their present situation as one of
"working for whites", or as being similar to their previous lives "on
the farms". The word used by them to refer to the co-op - "Trust" - is
the same as that with which they describe the Government planners who
earlier subdivided their fields; an indication that the former
organisation is seen as merely another phase in the intrusion into their
lives of external, Government control. This time, as they see it, the
"Trust" took their land away altogether: many claim that they once owned
fields but that these now "belong" to the co-op.9
Even though the co-op's official records refer to these people as "plot
owners", it seems reasonable for them to assume that the lands on which
they work are no longer their own. The type of crop they grow is dic-
tated: a frequent complaint is that they may no longer plant the other
foods - pumpkins, beans, morogo - which they used to cultivate between
9
 In fact, the land officially belongs to the Government's SA Bantu
Trust, and each plotholder pays an annual rent for his fields. Plots
falling vacant are reallocated by the chief and co-op officials, on
the basis of whether or not the applicants are likely to be "good,
progressive" farmers agreeable to the co-op's improvements.
- 20 -
their rows of mealies to supplement their diet. The time of harvest is
dictated: Karel Ralebetse claims that since the introduction of the co-op
he has been forbidden to go to his fields early in the summer and pick
green mealies, as he used to, for his children to eat. As discussed
earlier, the way of ploughing fields is dictated, and the system of
recruitment of labour has undergone a change because decisions about when
work is to begin and end are now made from above. These new styles in
ploughing and labour recruitment, as already noted, have had varying
effects on different members of the community. But more uniformly ex-
perienced is the general change - of which these details are only a small
part - in people's control over their own affairs and activities. It
is this change which explains why many of them see their contemporary
situation as one of doing a few months compulsory labour on the co-op's
fields each year in return for the bags of mealies they receive, or are
lent, after harvest. It is this change, too, which is the most signif-
icant factor in explaining such outbreaks of aggression and near-violence
as happened in the tractor incident described in the introduction.
The Chief and the Plotholders
The role of this paper is not a prescriptive one, and it would be inap-
propriate here to suggest alternative routes for the co-op which might
have led to a more truly "co-operative" spirit on the part of its par-
ticipants. The question is of analytic interest however, as its answer
is bound up with a more general consideration of authority structures
in the community, most notably with an examination of the chief's power.
The extension officer suggests that, had the co-op continued to operate
on something like its previous scale, with a large degree of responsi-
bility for control and decision-making by the plotholders themselves,
it might have been more successful. As it is, the official version of
the co-op's present structure is that the interests of "the tribe" are
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represented by the chief, John Masangu, and his councillor: that "the
Tribal Authority is there. . .to help their people11.
The chief's role in various aspects of the co-op's running has been
mentioned above. He and his councillor sit on the decision-making Di-
rectors' Committee; he chooses other committee-members; he reallocates
plots of land which fall vacant to people who are thought likely to be
"good farmers". Theoretically, his power is so extensive that he has
final veto on all decisions taken at the co-op. It has already been
noted, however, that there is some discrepancy between the official
structure of the co-op and the way it actually operates, and that the
white representative of the LLM, Mr de Jager, exercises power greater
than the authority of his official pos it ion. From conversations with
this man and observations of the co-op's daily running it is clear that
the chief is usually dissuaded by Mr de Jager from taking decisions which
the latter regards as irrational or agriculturally unsound. De Jager
leaves unquestioned, however, certain chiefly decisions, especially those
pertaining not to the project in general but to matters which have a
bearing on the chief's own, or his family's or certain friends', private
gain. This fine personal balance between the two men is worked out
through their jocular and boisterously humorous relationship. It is
weighted, however, by the fact that the LLM representative is a shrewd
and businesslike person with considerable agricultural expertise, whose
authority is reinforced, as already mentioned, by his being white in a
Government-linked organisation, and by the fact that he represents and
protects the interests of the organisation's financial backers. The
chief, on the other hand, is thought of in some quarters as a man who
drinks too much and who uses the little power allotted him under the Bantu
Authority system for corrupt ends. It might not be extreme, then, to
describe this as a situation in which the chief is being indulged by being
allowed to pursue his own private gain inside the structures provided
by the co-op. In return for this limited realm within which he can play
the despot, he speaks on behalf of the co-op to the residents of Morotse
- 22
and neighbouring villages: his voice, being that of traditional author-
ity, will be listened to by some villagers more readily than by others,
for reasons to be explored below. Rather than being a representative
of villagers' interests in the co-op, the chief could be more accurately
described as a spokesman for co-op interests in the sphere of village
life.
In substantiating the claim made above about the chief's tendency to
pursue his private gain, it is impossible to avoid drawing on reports
made by villagers, some of which may be exaggerated or even unsubstan-
tiated. What is important about these reports, however, is that they
demonstrate the antipathy of at least a part of the community to this
chief, and their willingness to believe him capable of corruption and
selfish actions.
According to de Jager, the chief, who has extensive fields of his own,
has in the past appropriated the entire crop grown on them for himself,
refusing to pay his debts to the co-op. In addition, he sends his wives
before harvest to pick green mealies from his fields. Neither of these
irregularities would be permitted an ordinary plotholder, and although
de Jager claims he is trying to persuade the chief to abide by the rules,
and thereby set a good example to his people, it is probable that these
misdemeanours of Masangu's will continue to be condoned. Similar is the
chief's behaviour in respect of grazing land for his cattle. Part of
the grand plan for the area was to create a nature reserve, to which end
one of the Trust farms was fenced with game fencing and several families
were moved from their homes on the farm. The chief, observing the good
quality of the grazing land on the farm in question, insisted on being
allowed to graze his own cattle there along with the antelope that had
been imported. Again, de Jager's reaction is one of amused resignation:
he proposes to circumvent the problem by fencing off an area on the edge
of the reserve especially for Masangu's cattle.
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Allegations made by villagers about the chief in his role as co-op au-
thority include the following: he has appropriated co-op funds for his
own use; he has favoured kinsmen by reserving for them import ant paid
positions within the co-op; he and his family members in the co-op have
given plotholders' sacks of grain to shopkeeper friends to sell; he
favours friends, relatives and fellow-Ndebeles by allocating fields to
them when they fall vacant, or by giving them larger fields and resi-
dential stands than are given to other residents. Such allegations exist
against a wider backdrop of complaints about the chief's more general
abuse of his authority, such as his misappropriation of school funds,
his favouring of Ndebele-speakers when planning the siting of facilities
such as schools anci reservoirs, and so on.
It was claimed earlier that this chief's role is more like that of co-op
spokesman than that of community representative. Such a claim is borne
out if one examines certain disciplinary measures employed by the co-op
in whose execution the chief is, to a greater or lesser extent, involved.
Firstly, he is alleged to have withheld work-seekers stamps from
villagers who have failed to pay the annual co-op subscription of RIO:
a payment compulsory for landless people and plotholders alike since,
it is claimed, the co-op provides benefits to the community as a whole.
Another sphere of punitive action in which the chief might come to play
a part concerns his role in allocating land. It was mentioned in the
section on recruitment of labour that co-op officials keep careful re-
cords of the number of helpers accompanying each plotholder to the fields.
A note is made, as well, of whether each plotholder has bought and used
pesticides, and of the amount of time he or she has spent on weeding.
Until now, this information has been used only in enabling co-op officials
to decide whether or not to grant loans of maize to tide particular "good"
farmers over years in which they are deeply in debt. It is proposed,
however, to make future decisions about possible confiscation and real-
location of plots on the basis of these records of each individual
plotholder's performance. Were this proposal ever to be carried out,
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it would be the chief who, nominally at least, would have to sanction
such decisions, since he is responsible for the allocation of land. For
the moment, however, the plan remains unrealised, since officials fear
plotholders' reactions.
Another thing which concerns the chief, this time as one of several
members on the Directors' Committee, is the meting out of a disciplinary
measure to plotholders who have used an unusual form of informal re-
sistance. During harvest time in 1983 Bafedi Ralebetse and her daughter
Paina, who were particularly upset about the rumour that the co-op would
be taking all the maize from the harvest in payment for debts incurred,
were careful while harvesting their crop to leave behind a substantial
number of cobs on the maize-plant stalks. This meant that at the end
of the week's harvesting period they not only had a pile of mealies to
be threshed by and taken off to the co-op, but also some mealies left
behind in their field. When they returned secretly in the evening to
collect these remaining cobs, they were spotted by someone who informed
on them. The two women were then summonsed to the co-op, where they were
severely reprimanded and fined twelve of their total yield of 89 bags
of maize.
At times, it is said, the chief uses the co-op as a forum within which
to exercise his authority governing other matters. One Morotse resident
complained that Masangu had administered a punishment at the co-op in a
case that should clearly have been brought to trial before the chief's
court, with evidence heard before the whole council in the time-honoured
way. Instead the man, whose pig had trespassed onto the field of a
neighbouring village's headman, and who had then become involved in a
fight with the headman, was taken to the co-op where he was bound hand
and foot and whipped by the chief without any intervention on the part
of the council.
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Accounts such as these explain a local priest's description of this chief
as "despotic". His assessment is shared by at least some of the
plotholders in Morotse, as is demonstrated by the abovementioned
allegations secretly made against Masangu. On the other hand, it was
the chief's intervention which finally persuaded the plotholders, despite
their grievances, to return to work on their fields after the tractor
incident. To explain this apparent contradiction one must look at the
role of ethnicity in the community, and at the way in which ethnic af-
filiation partly governs villagers' responses to chiefly authority.
Ethnicity and Authority 1 0
Earlier, it was stated that Morotse's residents are linguistically het-
erogeneous. Among the first arrivals to the area, there were roughly
equal numbers of Pedi- and Ndebele-speakers. The chief under whose ju-
risdiction they fell was, however, an Ndebele, and the wave of new ar-
rivals in the 1960s and 1970s consisted mainly of Ndebeles. This group
included both the late-arriving plotholders and the landless people who
came even later. It has also been suggested, earlier in this paper, that
there are hints of inter-ethnic tension in the way in which allegations
against the chief are phrased. He is said, by Pedis, to be favouring
Ndebele residents in certain respects by granting them, for instance,
larger stands.
What has not yet been mentioned is that during the tractor incident and
the associated disturbances it was the Pedis of the plotholding group
who were said, by most Ndebele informants, to be at the forefront of the
action. One suggested, as an explanation, that it was because this land
belongs to Lebowa that the Pedis were so angry about their use of it being
10
 This section of the paper is a condensation of what will finally
occupy a whole chapter of a thesis: it therefore lacks the detail
which a fuller version will entail.
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interfered with; another said she thought the Pedis were anti-white and
this was due to their not having "grown up with the whites, as we did".
The Ndebele village headman, on the other hand, stated that it was both
Pedis and Ndebeles who were shouting and swearing at the extension officer
on the day before the tractor incident when plotholders went to the co-op
to collect their accounts: "I was so ashamed when even the big camp above
the road went along with the small camp and swore at Sithole".11 Pedi
informants agreed that there was equal antagonism being shown by members
of both ethnic groups. One Pedi-speaker claimed, however, that no unity
could be maintained because of the Ndebeles' deferential and obedient
attitude to their chief: "they just clap their hands and say 'Masangu1
when he speaks".
It can be seen, then, that although there is a stereotype according to
which it was the Pedis who were doing the "fighting" and who had planned
and executed the protest, this is not to say that dissatisfaction about
the co-op, and even about the chief, was not widespread on both sides
of the ethnic divide. But the contrast - if one allows this stereotype
some weight - between the outspoken resistance of the Pedis and the ap-
parent rapidity with which the chief's authority was accepted by the
Ndebeles, can tentatively be explained in the light of two factors. On
the one hand, the widely diverging ways in which colonialism was expe-
rienced by these two groups resulted in strongly contrasting attitudes
towards traditional authority. On the other, these diverging recent
histories are overlaid onto traditional social structures that differ
considerably from one another, especially as regards their marriage rules
and practices. The interaction between these factors can throw some light
on the contrasting attitudes of Morotse's Pedi- and Ndebele-speakers
towards the chief's authority.
11
 The fields in the big camp are mostly held by Ndebeles, and those
in the small camp by Pedis: the headman is here expressing her sense
of betrayal that even the Ndebeles joined in the demonstration.
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The Ndzundza Ndebele had lived as indentured labour tenants on white farms
of the south-eastern Transvaal since their defeat by the Boers in 1883.
Their royal family was scattered, its members living on various farms,
and their role as rulers severely limited by their and their people's
subordination to these farmers, whose permission had to be asked, for
example, to hold tribal meetings or initiation schools. It is possible
that as their role became minimised in areas such as that of the allo-
cation of land, the adjudication of cases and other secular activities,
it began to focus more on the ritual domain: the holding of initiation
schools for instance was something about which, according to informants,
no white farmer had any objections. Many of Morotse's Pedi inhabitants,
in contrast, had experienced labour tenancy for one generation only; even
within that time they had had some liberty to move between different
farms, mission stations, African freehold land and the Pedi heartland
itself; and ongoing contact had been maintained with communities and
chiefs living in the heartland.l2 Unlike their Ndebele counterparts,
then, they were in touch with a tradition of chieftainship in which
secular power and control was still very much at issue.13
In summary, it is suggested that the resulting Ndebele pattern might have
been one of loyalty to a chief whose role was strictly circumscribed by
white landlords/employers. In contrast, the Pedi expectations of a chief
were, and are, that he should articulate and express community feeling,
even if this involves coming into conflict with higher authorities. This
view, which is close to that described by Comardff (1974) for the Tshidi
Tswana, is borne out by a statement from the same Pedi informant whose
perplexity at the Ndebeles' ready submission to authority was cited
12
 Cooper (1974); interviews with Namolelo Mathibela and Monica Makofane
(1983).
13
 Although the effective defeat of the Pedi polity occurred in 1879,
there has been since that date a tradition of fierce resistance in
which it was frequently chiefs who supported, or even voiced, the
objections of their people. Yawitch (1981); interviews with Alpheus
Mthethwa (1981) and Johannes Masangu (1983).
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above: he claims that a chief should be a listener and follower of his
people's wishes, and that if he fails to act on their behalf they will
fight with, or even kill him.11*
The other factor explaining why it was that the Ndebele majority of
Morotse's plotholders appeared so ready, despite their grievances, to
accept the compromise offered by their chief, is the rule about marriage
adhered to by this group. The traditional ideal, still accurately re-
flected in current practice, is one of clan exogamy.15 This accounts for
the impression which an outsider cannot help but form that, in the core
group of plotholding Ndebeles, virtually everyone is related to everyone
else. A more important effect of exogamy, for this paper, is the fact
that many of these early-arriving Ndebele plotholding families have ties
of kinship - consanguineal or more frequently affinal - to the chief.
Of a sample of landed Ndebele households surveyed, 57% have direct family
links to Chief Masangu, of which well over half are relationships es-
tablished via marriage. This widespread linkage is due not only to the
practice of clan exogamy, but also to its being combined with polygyny,
the incidence of which among Ndebeles in the community is still high when
compared with their Pedi neighbours. Polygyny is most commonly
practised, of course, by the chief and his closest kinsmen, and this may
further serve to proliferate the marriage links, engendered by clan
exogamy, between his and other families.16
1U
 It was earlier mentioned that a number of Morotse residents, espe-
cially Pedis, are strong adherents of Christianity. The informant
quoted here, and many others with similar views, belong to Pedi
Christian families. Interestingly, though they might reject
traditionalism in most respects, they still hold strong views
partly traditionally derived - on what constitutes correct behaviour
for a chief.
15
 There are, however, a few instances of patrilateral parallel cousin
marriage - "you may marry your father s sister's daughter, but it
is better to marry a stranger".
16
 This, of course, is not true of cases in which the various wives of
a polygynist are "sisters" or women from the same clan, as sometimes
happens.
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The practice of exogamy in precapitalist Southern African societies has
been seen by anthropologists and historians as one of several alternative
ways in which the integration of society can be achieved. Preston-Vfhyte
(1974), summarising this approach, shows that where cousin marriage
serves to reinforce and perpetuate existing links, exogamy initiates new
marriage links in each generation, and serves thus to unite, for instance,
dispersed and scattered settlements such as those of most Nguni. When
discussing the political implications of these different marriage prac-
tices, however, most attention has been given to the use of cousin mar-
riage: it incorporates political subordinates into a royal family while
maintaining the status distinction between them and their royal affines,
and thus- retains wealth and power in the hands of the ruling elite (Leach
1963, Delius 1983, Bonner 1980)- Less has been said of the effects of
clan exogamy in providing links between rulers and their subjects, per-
haps because the topic seems too obvious to need further elaboration.
In an inter-ethnic Bantustan context such as that of Morotse, however,
it can throw some light on the much-abused and much-maligned notion of
ethnicity, whose quasi-mystical significance can here be seen to be re-
ducible in some measure to the practical effects of different types of
marriage links.
It is not possible here to draw the obvious contrast with the Pedi section
of the village. Although marriage with both cross- and parallel-cousins
is practised by its "old families", no point can clearly be made about
the implications of this for Pedi attitudes to authority, since there
is no Pedi chief in the village, but only a "headman" from a chiefly
family who is appointed by the co-op to act as its mouthpiece. Prefer-
ential marriage and its resulting strong linkages in this community have
implications, rather, for matters such as access to and the distribution
of scarce resources.
Ndebele attitudes to the chief, then, derive at least in part from a
combination of history and marriage preferences. The chief's closest
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relatives, like Nobutshe Masangu the Ndsbele headman who is the widow
of his half-brother, and Nogeli Masangu whose genealogy shows two close
marriage links to him, took no part in the demonstrations at all. The
other Ndebele plotholders, though tied to the chief by strong loyalties
reinforced in many cases by kinship links, ignored these ties until the
moment when these were invoked by the chief in his bid to appease and
calm the plotholders. It is the argument of this paper that the
acquiescent response of the Ndebele plotholders to their chief's appeal
caused a break in the ranks of demonstrators, and it was this that served
to prevent any continuation of their protest against the co-op.
Conclusion
To conclude, then, the villagers of Morotse are aligned in a number -of
different ways, some of these alignments having been fostered or inten-
sified by the co-op's presence, while others were minimised by it.
Members of "old families" with access to land, and to the networks of
support and reciprocity that make for a sense of community, are manifestly
better-off than the newcomers, who possess neither of these resources.
With the co-op's inception, some of the latter have become temporarily
linked to landed families as employees. The community of plotholders
itself does not, however, constitute a simple unity. Some of its members
have lived in the district for longer than others, and have built up more
resources, both economic and social, than others. The difference between
these two categories has been minimised by the co-op, and has been re-
placed by a stratification based on access to wages earned in urban
centres of employment. People with money to pay labourers, rather than
country-dwellers owning ploughs and oxen or a tractor, are now the ones
most likely to succeed in agriculture.
While the plotholding group may be seen to occupy a relatively privileged
position in this village, it is not surprising that they are also the
most vociferous critics of recent attempts at "development", since it
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is their activities which are most directly interfered with by. these new
schemes, and their landless neighbours have, by comparison, no such ef-
fective basis for united action. The unity momentarily attained by the
plotholding community during such events as the tractor incident is
shown, however, to be vulnerable to a further split in village life:
between ethnic groups with different histories and social structures.
In the light of developments in other Bantustan situations, in which
competition over scarce resources has led to increased ethnic conflict,
it may be that similar divisions will plague future attempts by Morotse's
farmers to express their indignation at outside interference with their
use of the land.
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